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Adequate's not Good Enough
The response of banks to new capita! regulations
shows that banks are not satisfied merely with
maintaining adequate capital positions. Not sur-
prisingly, undercapitalized banks took steps to
improve their capital positions. However, even
banks that were adequately capitalized according
to objective regu latory standards scrambled to
increase their capital ratios in recent years. The
response of the "adequately" capitalized banks
suggests that pressures to build up bank capital
were fairly widespread, even though most banks
more than met the minimum capital standards.
This Weekly Letter looks at how banks went about
adjusting capital positions in recent years. Itturns
out that much ofthe adjustment was accom-
plished through increases in bank capital itself.
At the same time, though, banks also improved
their capital positions by reducing their riskier
assets, which suggests that capital constraints
could have contributed to slow bank loan
growth. Today, however, a large portion of the
banking industry is well-capitalized, so capital
constraints should not be a major impediment to
the growth of bank credit.
Risk-based capital
Risk-based capital standards for banks, intro-
duced in 1990, were phased in fully at the end
of 1992. In contrast to the uniform capital stand-
ards in place before 1990, the new rules base the
amount of capital a bank must hold against an
asset on the asset's default risk. Another new twist
is that banks are explicitly required to hold capi-
tal against their off-balance sheet activities, which
include loan commitments, standby letters of
credit, and derivatives. The regulations specify
formulas for transforming the notional values of
different off-balance sheet items to "on-balance
sheet equivalent" values.
The regulations assign risk weights to varieties of
on-balance sheet assets and off-balance items;
those deemed to have higher default risk have
higher weights. For example, Treasury securities
are given a zero weight, federally sponsored
agencies securities are given a 20 percent
weight, home mortgages get a 50 percent weight,
and consumer loans, business loans, and com-
mercial real estate loans get a 100 percent
weight. The various on-balance sheet assets
and the on-balance sheet equivalent values of
off-balance items are multiplied by the appropri-
ate weights and then summed to get total risk-
weighted assets.
The risk-weighted capital requirements are stated
in terms of ratios of capital to risk-weighted as-
sets. The regulations specify two ratios, a Tier 1
ratio, in which capital consists mainly of equity,
and a Total Capital ratio, in which capital con-
sists of equity as well as certain liabilities, in-
cluding subordinated debt.
Even though some assets, like Treasury securities,
get a zero risk-weight, effectively banks still face
capital requirements on such assets because
banks also are subject to the so-called leverage
ratio. This is basically the ratio of equity capital
to total on-balance sheet assets. The reason for
having this ratio is that the risk-based standards
do not fully account for differences in risk relat-
ing to changes in interest rates or other types of
market risk. With the leverage ratio, then, capital
requirements against assets Iike Treasury securi-
ties are not zero.
Under, adequateiy, or weii-capitaiized
Regulations currently stipulate minimum risk-
based capital ratios of 4 percent for the Tier 1
ratio and 8 percent for the Total Capital ratio.
Banks with ratios above these minimums gener-
ally would be considered adequately capitalized,
provided they are otherwise in healthy condition.
(The minimum required leverage ratio for a bank
also depends on its general financial condition.
For healthy banks the minimum likely would be
3 or 4 percent.)
To be considered well-capitalized, however, a
healthy bank has to have aTier 1 ratio of6 percent
or higher and a total capital ratio of 10 percent or
higher. (To be considered well-capitalized, a
healthy bank also would have to have a leverage
ratio of 5 percent or more.)
To give some idea of how banks stacked up
against the risk-based standards, we can look atFRBSF
some data from a sample of large banks (assets
greater than $300 million) that report information
relating to risk-based capital standards. At year-
end 1990, this sample included about 720 banks,
accounting for about 75 percent of total bank
assets. Using only the 4 percent Tier 1 ratio and
8 percent Total Capital ratio cutoffs, undercapi-
talized banks accounted for about 30 percent of
the. assets of the sample of banks at the end of
1990. Adequately capitalized banks, those with
risk-based capital ratios above the minimums but
not meeting the 6 percent and 10 percent cutoffs,
accounted for about half of the assets. That leaves
about 20 percent of the assets in sample banks
that could be considered well-capitalized. (If the
leverage ratio also is considered, the percent of
assets held by well-capitalized banks would be
only slightly lower.) Once again, even some
ofthose banks \A/Quid not be viev/ed as \'Vell=
capitalized by regulators, unless they were
otherwise healthy institutions.
Capital constraints
If banks were satisfied with adequate capital,
these figures wouId suggest that most ofthe as-
sets in the banking industry were held at banks
that were not facing serious capital constraints in.
1990. However, when we see which banks have
adjusted to the new capital standards over the
past couple of years, it appears that pressures to
build up capital were fairly widespread in the
banking industry.
The adjustment of capital ratios among banks is
shown in the table. The sample of banks used in-
c! udes institutions that had over $300 million in
assets at the end of1990 or 1992 and were not
Adjusting to Risk-Based Capital Standards
Average Percent Change:*
1990:Q4 to 1992:Q4
Bank Total Total Risk-
I Capitalization Capital Capital Adjusted
Rat.io Assets
Under 40.2 29.4 -10.8
Adequate 22.3 16.0 -6.3
Well 5.8 8.6 2.8
*Measured as the log difference times 100.
involved in any acquisitions or mergers in 1991
or 1992. The banks are classified as undercapital-
ized, adequately capitalized, or well-capitalized
according to their risk-based capital ratios at
the end of 1990. For example, well-capitalized
banks are those with Tier 1 capital ratios greater
than or equal to 6 percent and Total Capital
ratios greater than or equal to 10 percent. For
each of the three groups, the table shows the
average percent changes in Total Capital ratios,
total capital, and risk-adjusted assets for the two-
year period 1991-1992.
As might be expected, the data in the first col-
umn show that the undercapitalized banks on
average increased their capital ratios more than
other banks. However, even the adequately cap-
italized banks as a group showed a very large
improvement in theii capital positions. The per-
cent change in the Total Capital ratios is around
four times larger for the adequately capitalized
banks than for the well-capitalized banks. This is
compelling evidence that banks were not satis-
fied with merely maintaining adequate capital
positions.
The adjustment mix
A bank that feels constrained by its risk-based
capital ratio has two options: It can increase its
capital, and it can reduce its risk-adjusted assets.
In reducing total risk-adjusted assets, a bank can
merely shrink assets and it can shift assets from
higher to lower risk-weight categories.
The second and third columns in the table show
that banks used both options in adjusting to risk-
based capital standards. The data suggest that
this group of banks achieved much ofthe adjust-
ment by increasing total capital itself. However,
they also sharply contracted their risk-adjusted
assets; and this held true both for the under-
capitalized banks and the adequately capitalized
banks. Separate statistical analysis supports these
findings even when controlling for differences
in economic conditions across banking markets.
That analysis also indicates that the higher-risk
assets were affected more by the capital con-
straints than the lower-risk assets. In fact, differ-
ences in risk-based capital ratios among banks
were not related to the growth of zero risk-weight
assets.
This evidence that the growth in higher risk assets
was weaker among the lower-capitalized banks
than among the well-capitalized ones and thatcapital constraints were fairly widespread is con-
sistent with recent studies that find capital con-
straints having contributed tothe weakness in bank
lending in recent years. It should be mentioned,
though, that several of these studies find that
most of the unusual weakness in bank credit has
been due to factors other than capital regulation.
Eased constraints
The bank capitalization picture today, however,
has changed considerably, as banks' efforts to
build up their risk-based capital ratios have been
very effective. For example, at the end of 1992,
among the large banks reporting data relating to
risk-adjusted capital, about 85 percent of the
assets were held by institutions at or above the
6 percent and 10 percent cutoffs for Tier 1 and
Total Capital ratios, respectively. With such a
large portion of bank assets in well-capitalized
banks, capital positions should not be a con-
straint on bank lending.
Conclusion
Banks clearly are not satisfied with merely hav-
ing adequate capital. Over the past few years,
even banks satisfying minimum regulatory cap-
ital standards made concerted efforts to push
their capital ratios higher. In doing so, banks sub-
stantially increased capital itself, but they also
reduced their higher risk assets, such as business,
consumer, and commercial real estate loans.
The efforts tobuild up capital have been success-
ful, and today a large portion ofthe banking in-
dustry is well-capitalized. Therefore, although
capital constraints may have accounted for some
of the slow loan growth in recent years, at this
point, banks' capital positions in and ofthem-
selves should not deter lending. In fact, recently,
we have seen some pickup, with bank loans regi-
stering relatively healthy increases from May to
July. While it still may be too soon to declare a
permanent turnaround in bank credit, as long as
the other supply and demand factors are in
place, banks have the capital to respond.
Fred Furiong
Assistant Vice President
MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1993
On July 20, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a mid-year report to the Congress
on the Federal Reserve's monetary policy objectives for the remainder of 1993. The report reviews economic
and financial developments in 1993 and presents the economic outlook heading into 1994. For single or multiple
copies of the report, write to the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
P.o. Box 7702, San Francisco, CA 94120, phone (415) 974-2246 or fax (415) 974-3341.
Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be addressed to the editor or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve publications can be
obtained from t~e Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco 94120.
Phone (415) 974-2246, Fax (415) 974-3341.~ I.l:\ 'S~U! ueaqAos 41lM
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in june, july, August, and December.